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THE FAILURE OF THE INTERIM

REGULATORY PROGRAM UNDER THE
SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977: THE NEED FOR

FLEXIBLE CONTROLS
ROBERT

I.

ACT As ONE COMPONENT OF
SCHEME OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION BALANCING
IMPORTANT POLICY OBJECTIVES.

THE SURFACE MINING

A

A.

J. GAGE*

Introduction: The Need For Reasonable Environmental
Legislation.

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
conferred a detailed charter of powers upon the Secretary of the
Interior and established a new agency, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM), to implement its provisions.' Although the legislation
was developed in response to a widely recognized need for comprehensive environmental protection in relation to surface mining,
this protection was not its sole concern. The Act was enacted during a period when inflation was weakening the national economy
and when substantial efforts were underway to increase the proportion of energy derived from coal.' In light of this, Congress intended
that protection of the environment was to be reasonably attained
without needlessly or excessively increasing the cost of coal nor
impeding the expansion of production necessary to meet future
energy needs.3 Moreover, the legislation was intended to comple* Member, District of Columbia Bar; B.A., Kent State University, 1973; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1977; M.P.P., Harvard University John F. Kennedy School
of Government, 1977.
This article has been written at the request of the West Virginia Law Review.
The author has participated in the Surface Mining Litigation, see note 7, infra, on
behalf of the coal mining industry. The views expressed herein, however, are solely
those of the author and are not to be attributed to others.
I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 101-908, 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West Supp. 1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act or the
SMCRA].
2 The current Administration, in proposing a substantial national energy plan,
was particularly concerned that although coal constitutes ninety percent of the
United States' conventional energy reserves, it supplied only eighteen percent of
domestic energy consumption. PRESIDENT CARTER's NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, DETAILED WHITE HoUSE REPORT COVERING STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT, VI (1977).
Congress, indeed, explicitly stated that the regulation of surface-mining and
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ment the broad scheme of federal environmental and energy legislation, and to be balanced with the policy objectives of those statutes. I
The Secretary is to implement the Act in two phases-an
interim transitional program lasting nearly three years in which
the federal government is to have principal responsibility, and a
permanent regulatory program in which state governments are to
exercise substantial autonomy. The interim program developed by
OSM has been in effect since May 1978, and is the focus of discussion in this article.
What is particularly evident and noteworthy from a close
analysis of the interim regulatory program is that OSM, in its
desire to control the adverse environmental impact of surface mining, has not paid sufficient attention to the expense of the regulations to coal mine operators, and the operators' ability to produce
coal at a reasonable cost. Rather than balancing the environmental
benefits with coal production "costs" and deriving a program responsive to each, OSM has failed to give weight to the latter.
Although the Department of Interior was promulgating the broadest set of regulations in its history, and one of the most pervasive
ever by a federal agency, it nonetheless publicly acknowledged
that it did not deem it necessary to analyze the regulations' economic effects. 5 The regulations impose undue restriction upon the
reclamation was to be conducted in a reasonable manner. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(e)
(West Supp. 1978).

See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7402-7418,
7521-7525, 7541-7546, 7550, 7571-7574, 7601-7615, 7641-7642 (1976); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1265, 1281-1292,

1311-1328, 1341-1345, 1361-1376 (1978); Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 22, 25, 30, 33, 40,
43, 48, 49 U.S.C.); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6901-6987 (1977); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§

6201-6422 (and scattered section of 15 U.S.C.) (1976); Energy Supply and Environ-

mental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974); Federal

Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 787-790(h); Endangered Species
Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. 1531-1543 (1974); Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-

1136 (1974); Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 184,
191, 201, 202(a), 203, 207, 208-1, 208-2, 209, 352 (West Supp. 1978) (amending
Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1971)). See also H.R. REP. No.

218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1977); Note, Coal Leasing Amendments Act

Should Increase Production and Public Benefits From Coal Leasing On Federal
Land, 16 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1033, 1037 (1976); Drueger, Management of Energy

Resources on FederalLands (Energy Law Service Monograph 11A) (1978).
1 42 Fed. Reg. 62,639, 62,640 (1977) (the Act's enforcement provisions will be
codified at 30 C.F.R. §§ 700-837); 42 Fed. Reg. 44,920, 44,924 (1977) (record of
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operator because they frequently set forth rigid design criteria and
invariable standards. Environmental quality could have been
amply protected by less restrictive measures. This failure to neither appreciate the industry's costs from the regulations or to recognize the benefits of a flexible program are a critical defect in
OSM's work.
Neither the industry, the public, or other concerned federal
and state agencies sat silently through the regulations' developmental process. They submitted substantial comments and testimony to the agency during the notice and comment period preceding the finalization of the regulations. Thereafter, the industry
petitioned OSM to reconsider the most onerous regulations, and
challenged the lawfulness of many in federal court. 7 Although the
district court upheld most of the challenged provisions, its decisions in large measure reflect a "hands-off" judicial policy, leaving the regulations to the regulators, rather than to exercise judicial judgment as to their wisdom and propriety.
I do not, however, claim, nor would it be fair to claim, that
the development of these regulations represents bad faith or a
capricious disregard of the public interest on the part of OSM. On
the contrary, OSM appears to have approached its task in a conscientious manner. The agency did, however, produce a voluminous
set of regulations in a very short period of time. I believe that the
failings of the regulations have resulted, in part, from these circumstances. Moreover, they appear to be a consequence of not
giving careful attention to Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
rulemaking principles.8 In particular, the public was not advised
of the basis for the regulations during the notice and comment
period.' Because the public did not know what information and
preliminary hearing on proposed regulations), [all citation to the Federal Register
hereinafter cited directly to the page on which the material appears].

' Section 201(g) of the Act provides that "[a]fter the Secretary has adopted
the regulations required by Section 501 of this Act, any person may petition the
Director [of OSMI to initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or repeal
of a rule under this Act." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1211(g) (West Supp. 1978).
7 In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978)
(hearing on motion for temporary injunction); In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978) (hearing on motion for summary judgment), appeal docketed. Nos. 78-2190, 78-2191, 78-2192 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 1978).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
The proposed rules, while urging "full public participation" during the comment period and suggesting that those submitting comments focus on "technical
information" (42 Fed. Reg. 44,920-21 (1977)), identified but a single technical study
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technical literature OSM was relying upon, they were unable to
focus their analysis and remarks accordingly. There was thus no
real opportunity for meaningful comments or discussion regarding
the technical foundation of the regulations.' 0
Notwithstanding the fact that the interim program is relatively short-lived, analysis of these regulations remains timely.
The nation will live with the regulation of surface mining for many
years to come. As the regulatory scheme is developed and revised,
and as states promulgate their own regulations, it is important to
recognize the errors made in its incipient stages. It is through such
analysis that there can be a constructive and thoughtful evolution.
Analysis of the interim program is further timely in the sense
that it will identify problems likely to befall other regulatory programs. Government regulation has increasingly become more pervasive. Concomitantly, instances where government agencies move
through rulemaking proceedings with extremely important consequences are increasing. It is thus important to future regulators
that we not turn our backs upon the mistakes of their predecessors.
B.

Coal as Energy.

The most important policy which should have been balanced
on which the Department relied, relating to a single section of the regulations (42
Fed. Reg. 44,922 (1977)). Under the A.P.A., the agency had an obligation to disclose
to interested parties the data upon which its proposed rules were based. An agency
must reveal the basis of its regulations to enable the public to make meaningful
comments. See United States v. Nova Scotia Foods Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240,
251-52 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393,
n.67 (1973), cert. denied. 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
Wo
For example, had OSM indicated it was relying upon an interim report
prepared by the Skelly and Loy Consulting Engineers as the basis for its spoil
placement regulations, the authors of the report could have, at that time, informed
OSM that such reliance was misplaced. See SKELLY & Loy, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF SURFACE MINING METHODS, HEAD-OF-HOLLOW FILL AND MOUNTAIN REMOVAL

(Interim Report 1977). It was not, however, until the certified index to the administrative record was lodged with the court during subsequent litigation that this
reliance became known. Thereafter, during the notice and comment period following OSM's reconsideration of the spoil placement regulations LeRoy D. Loy, Jr.
criticized the use of the study as an apparent source for the design requirements of
head-of-hollow fills. See 43 Fed. Reg. 52,734 (1978). In a letter to the Director of
OSM, he registered "strong disagreement with [the] revised interim rules and the
manner in which they were presented." Letter from Leroy D. Loy, Jr., P.E., to
Walter N. Heine, Director, OSM (Dec. 4, 1978). See also J. Robins, Skelly & Loy
consulting engineers, Testimony During Public Hearings on Proposed Interim
Regulations (Sept. 21, 1977), excerpted in note 51, infra.
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with the protection of the environment is the attainment of continuous, enhanced coal production to meet future energy needs in the
face of diminishing, increasingly expensive petroleum supplies.
Section 102(f) of the SMCRA states that OSM must "assure that
the coal supply essential to the Nation's energy requirements, and
to its economic and social well-being is provided and strike a balance between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and the Nation's need for coal as an essential source of
energy.""
This purpose can only be achieved if the agency's regulations
are reasonable, flexible and based on an understanding of what is
physically, technologically and economically possible. In all too
many instances, as will be illustrated herein, the regulations fail
to take these important factors into account. The inflexibility of
the regulations will result in the dislocation of many small operators, '2 disruptions of energy supply and unnecessarily increased
costs that will impose additional hardships upon the electric utility
consumer with no significant improvement in the reclamation of
mined land. The problem is most acute at the onset of the program
for the small operator who is incapable of spreading the increased
costs over a large tonnage of coal, and who may be sandwiched into
fulfilling fixed-price long-term contracts made at relatively low3
prices under different market conditions during an earlier period.'
I 30 U.S.C.A. § 1202(f) (West Supp. 1978). See H.R. REP. No. 189,94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 87 (1975), wherein Congress changed its proposed legislation in conformance with President Ford's suggesfed modification to strike "a balance between
environmental protection and the need for coal production." See also H.R. REP. No.
896, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (1976). While developing the permanent regulatory
program, OSM acknowledged its need to balance coal production with environmental protection.
[T]he Secretary ... has decided to consult with [the President's Council of Economic Advisorsl prior to promulgation of final regulations. This
will assure that the final rules now under consideration will strike the
proper balance between protection of the environment and agricultural
productivity and the Nation's need for coal as an essential source of
energy.
44 Fed. Reg. 1355 (1979). See also 119 CONG. REc. 33,305 (1973) (remarks of Sen.
Baker); 120 CONG. REC. 23,652 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Mink).
1"Congress was concerned that the small operator would be severely impacted
by the regulations. For example, § 502(c) of the Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252(c) (West
Supp. 1978), gave these companies an additional eight months to comply with the
interim environmental performance standards. See also notes 13 and 14, infra.
11The House Committee, considering predecessor legislation during the 94th
Congress, warned that the Interim Program should "not threaten the continuous
supply of coal by the sudden imposition of new performance criteria" and should
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The situation is analogous to that which arose shortly after the
implementation of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1969." A significant number of small tonnage operators, particularly those mining in mountainous terrain, were unable to afford
the expensive safety machinery required by the FMHSA and went
out of business.'"
C.

InflationaryImpact.

Under the SMCRA, Executive Order, the Department's own
regulations and the Administrative Procedure Act, the Department had an obligation to take heed of the inflationary impact of
the regulations on the nation's economy before finally promulgating the regulations.' 6 But the Department's records show that it
be implemented "without an interruption of the delivery of coal." H.R. REP. No.
45, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 85 (1975). However, 65% of all surface mines produce
less than 50,000 tons per year and nearly 90% of the auger mines produce less than
50,000 tons per year. The economic impact upon small operators resulting from
prior obligations, and the requirement that they report to a multitude of agencies
and conform to different design standards is obvious. Id. at 172-73. While it may
be true that many of the large western operators have not only economies of scale
but also new sales contracts with a profit margin that may allow them to conform
to the regulations, the smaller eastern operators are not likely to be in the same
position. Until 1972, the coal industry was "going out of business" for about 25 years
and many operators are stuck with bad long-term delivery contracts.
A study conducted by the Mining and Reclamation Council of America in
December of 1978 gave a preliminary indication of the impact or surface mining
regulations on small operators. The survey revealed that 60% of the opertors who
responded to the survey and who produce 100,000 tons of coal per year or less were
planning to leave the coal business due to the full OSM regulatory program. See 9
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2070 (1979).
" 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-960 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as FMSHA.
'5 See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 24,618 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hosmer). Evidence
that small operators mining in mountainous terrain are being put out of business
has been presented in a recent case filed against the Secretary of Interior in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Judge Glen Williams, in issuing a temporary injunction against the enforcement of the environmental performance standards of the Act on February 14, 1979, found that "since
the passage of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, twentysix (26) Virginia coal producing companies have gone out of business, due partly
to the restrictions imposed by the Act." Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Wise, Virginia, No. 78-0244-B (W.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1979)
(memorandum opinion and order). See also, 125 CONG. REc. 87259 (daily ed. June
7, 1979) (testimony of Mr. Phillip Trent); 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2070 (March 9, 1979)
(A survey by the mining and Reclamation Council of America reports that the
Surface Mine Regulations could close up to 1000 small operators.)
" Executive Order No. 11,821, issued under authority of the Council on Wage
and Price Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976), requires agencies proposing the promulga.
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never undertook an analysis of this impact. Although OSM attempted to justify its deferral of this analysis in various ways, its
ultimate justification was actually based on a single study authorized by the Congressional Budget Office which did not even deal
with the regulations. 7 In fact, the study was written before the
regulations were even drafted, and addressed the question of
whether legislation in this general area would cause the expenditure of a substantial amount of federal funds. Apart from direct
expenditures from the federal treasury, the study never touched on
the question of the economic impact of OSM's program.
tion of rules or regulations to make an "evaluation" of the "inflationary impact"
of the proposals and to accompany any such rule or regulation with a "statement
which certifies that the inflationary impact of the proposal has been evaluated."
Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974), 3A C.F.R. § 203 (1974), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017 (1976), 3 C.F.R. § 161
(1977). According to OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-107
(1975), issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,821, the evaluation should include an analysis of the principal cost or other inflationary effects of the action on
markets, consumers, business, etc. and, where practical, an analysis of secondary
price effects. The evaluation should also include a comparison of the benefits to be
derived from the proposed action with the estimated inflationary impact and
should also indicate that a review of alternatives to the proposed action was undertaken.
The Department's own regulations, expressly incorporating OMB's CIRCULAR
No. A-107, require that an economic impact statement be prepared if the agency
determines that any of a list of criteria is satisfied, including the likelihood that
the action will give rise to national costs in excess of $150 million in a two year
period or of $100 million in any year; or to costs of half those amounts in any
industry; or if the action is expected to cause a decrease in supply of any energy
material in excess of the equivalent of 25,000 barrels of oil per day. See Dep't of
Interior, Regulations Respecting Economic Impact Statements (as revised Oct. 7,
1975). The Interim Regulations certainly meet these criteria and thus OSM was
bound to make the necessary analysis even in the absence of any independent legal
requirement. Cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
The SMCRA specifically incorporated APA requirements to promulgate reasonable regulations and it incorporated the arbitrary and capricious standard as a
basis for judging them. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202, 1276(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978). In view
of the aforementioned Congressional concern about the effects of the regulations on
the economy and coal supplies, the broad scope of the regulations and the agency's
knowledge from its own record, see P. Reeves, Director of OSM Task Force, Notes
on Interim Regulations (1977), that at least appreciable effects on the nation's
economy and supplies were inevitable, the Department was obligated to take a
"'hard look' at the salient problems," (including economic effects), and should
have demonstrated that it had "genuinely engaged in reasoned decision making."
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
11See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142-49 (1977); H.R. REP. No.
896, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 93-98 (1976) (cost analysis of proposed legislation).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

II. IN LIGHT OF THE IMPORTANT POLICY
OBJECTIVES, SUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY
MUST BE AFFORDED OPERATORS.

A.

Heterogeneity Of The Coal Industry.

Coal is mined in pockets throughout the United States. The
SMCRA governs the operation of roughly six thousand mines in
twenty-nine states. These mines appear in almost every conceivable geographic and climatic circumstance-the mountains and
hollows of West Virginia, the coastal plains of Texas, the mid-west
prairie lands, the deserts of Arizona and the snow laden Colorado
Rockies. Wet, dry, steep and flat land mining are all encompassed
by the Act. Both surface mining and, to some degree, the surface
effects of underground mining will be regulated."'
Regulation of mines operating under such diverse conditions
requires a very flexible approach. What may prevent adverse environmental impacts under one set of conditions may cause them
under another." What may be a practical and economically viable
approach under one set of conditions may prove to be financially
disastrous (if not impossible) under others.
Because of the diversity of the industry, Congress vested primary responsibility in the states, rather than in the federal government, to develop and implement the control and reclamation program. In the opening paragraphs of the SMCRA, Congress stated
that "because of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and
reclamation operations subject to this [Act] should rest with the
States. '2 " Thus, it was the intention of Congress that the states'
primacy was to be respected, and that the regulatory program was
to be developed in accordance with the diversity of conditions.2'
See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1266, 1291(28) (West Supp. 1978).
"[Tlhe most environmentally sound control measures are designed to account for the climate, geology, and the size of each mine." Dep't of Energy, Comments on Draft Permanent Regulations § 1.C.1 (Aug. 18, 1978).
30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(0 (West Supp. 1978).
"

21 Congress

further acknowledged the need to take into account differences in

mining conditions in its creation of and charge to OSM. "The Secretary, acting

through [OSM], shall. . . assist the States in the development of State Programs
for surface coal mining and reclamation operations which meet the requirements
of the Act, and at the same time, reflect local requirementsand local environmental
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Notwithstanding this, the OSM interim regulatory program was
structured on an across-the-board basis.? Not only did OSM set
specific design criteria for the construction of mining facilities and
establish precise methods for conducting certain mining operations, it also refused, in many instances, to permit variances which
would take specific circumstances (which may make the regulations unsuitable) into account.?
OSM should have tread more softly with its short-range interim program. To fully appreciate the diversities of mine site
areas, further experience in the operation of mining under the
SMCRA is required.24 The Secretary should have taken this need
for experience into account by promulgating an interim regulatory
program which requires operators to comply with practical operational changes rather than strict performance criteria. This would
have better served the basic purposes of the Act. In essence, the
and agriculturalconditions .... '30 U.S.C.A. § 1211(c) (West Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). See also 30 U.S.C.A. § 1221(b) (West Supp. 1978), emphasizing that
federally funded research was to take into account "the varying conditions and
needs of the respective States," and 30 U.S.C.A. § 1222(c) (West Supp. 1978),
requiring that the Secretary select research facilities on the basis of "special geographic, geologic, or climatic conditions within the immediate vicinity of the institute in relation to any special requirements of the research project .... "
" Substantial responsibility has been given to the Federal Government to
develop and implement what was intended to be a limited interim program. 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251(a), 1252(c) (West Supp. 1978).
2 Note that the U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) has criticized OSM for its propensity of relying upon design criteria, rather than numerical
controls, to implement performance standards. Referring to EPA's pollution control
practices as a guide, CWPS concluded that:
[Dlesign is best left unspecified so that the entity affected can comply
in the least costly way. We feel this to be especially the case for the
Surface Mining Regulations, because of the great diversity of conditions
under which the industry operates including rainfall, depth of overburden, topography, pH levels of discharges, pollution density in surrounding areas, etc .... [W]e prefer numerical standards rather than specifi-

cations of method ....
CWPS letter to Joan Davenport, Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals,
Dep't of Interior (Oct. 7, 1977).
21 This need for experience was emphasized by the Secretary of the Interior in
a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
only a few months before the legislation's enactment: "It has become increasingly
clear that we lack information about how successfully strip mined lands can be
reclaimed." Letter from Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary, Dep't of Interior to the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
United States Senate (April 22, 1977).
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interim program presented the opportunity to utilize flexible regulations in order to permit OSM to gain the necessary experience
and insight.
B.

TechnologicalAdvances.

A further disadvantage of OSM's inflexible regulatory approach is the likelihood that it will stifle technological advances.
Since the agency has specified the exact manner in which operators should accomplish certain objectives, construct facilities and
conduct certain operations, there is little room for engineers to
develop more efficient or effective means of so doing. The regulations may effectively "freeze" the "state of the art" in surface
mining and land reclamation technology. If engineers are not allowed to use creative and innovative designs to achieve a final
product, it will be difficult for them to improve on the present
techniques for mining coal and to develop more economical methods for producing energy in the future.

I. THE SURFACE MINING ACr

INTENDED THAT
OPERATORS HAVE THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY.

Flexibility can most appropriately be achieved in two ways.
First, regulations should ibe geared toward achieving certain objectives and standards rather than establishing the specific methods
of achievement. Second, regulations should contain procedures
whereby individual operators can obtain relief, in the form of variances, from particular provisions. Needless to say, the need for
variances is most acute if the regulations establish specific, universally applicable design and construction criteria.
A.

Statutory Language.

From the onset, Congress intended flexibility in regulation. As
was set forth above, the opening sections of the SMCRA immediately acknowledge the diversity in mining conditions and the need
for states to develop their own means of meeting the Act's performance standards.2 The Act authorizes the Secretary to establish
detailed design criteria in only one provision which was relative to
the construction of waste dams. Section 515(b)(13) required operators to design waste pile dams "in accordance with the standards
and criteria developed pursuant to subsection (f) of [Section
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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5151." '29 Section 515(f), in turn, provided that such standards and
criteria were to be developed by the Secretary in cooperation with
the Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers in a separate rulemaking
proceeding having a unique 135 day time schedule, as opposed to
the ninety day rulemaking period for all of the other interim regulations under section 501(a) of the Act.?
In sharp contrast to the waste dam construction standard,
there is not a word within the other operational or reclamation
standards which suggests that Congress intended to authorize the
Secretary to dictate nationwide design and construction criteria.
Rather, the Act repeatedly directs compliance with performance,
not design standards. Given the Act's approach relative to waste
pile dams, Congress in all likelihood intended to distinguish them
from other regulated subjects.28
This scheme becomes even more apparent when viewed in
conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency's enabling
legislation. EPA, for the most part, is limited to establishing numerical effluent standards to regulate pollution levels. 29 Industry
has wide latitude to select the means of meeting those limitations.
Although EPA had, in fact, attempted more pervasive regulation,
in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States the United States Supreme Court determined that Congress' failure to specifically authorize detailed "work practice" procedures foreclosed the EPA
from doing so.?0 The Court relied on the fact that the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, authorizing EPA to promulgate design,
equipment, work practice or operational standards, stood in stark
contrast to the earlier enabling legislation at issue. The fact that
Congress specifically authorized more detailed standards in its
later legislation implied that the earlier provision did not allow
EPA such latitude. Following the Court's rationale in Adamo,
28 30 U.S.C.A.

§ 1265(b)(13) (West Supp. 1978).

30 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1978). The longer period and separate
proceeding were undoubtedly a recognition that it would require considerably
greater effort and input to develop detailed design criteria than to develop more
general operating standards.
Cf. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868).
Under §8 108 to 112 of the Clean Air Act, numerical controls in the form of
emissions limitations or standards are imposed for existing, new, and hazardous
pollutants. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7412 (1976). Similarly, §§ 301, 304, 306 and 307 of
the Water Pollution Control Act impose numerical limits in the form of effluent
limitations for pollutants for existing, new, and toxic sources of pollutants. 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316, 1317 (West Supp. 1978).
- 434 U.S. 275, 285-89 (1978).
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Congressional authorization of specific design and construction
criteria solely for waste dams, in the context of surface mining, is
a significant indication that such criteria were not intended elsewhere.
B.

Legislative History.

Not only does the statute indicate that regulation should take
into account the differences in conditions from one mine to another, but substantial commentary in its early legislative history
of prior unsuccessful legislative proposals demonstrates concern
that such regulation be flexible. Congress addressed the need for
both viable standards and variances from standards:
IFIlexibility is a necessary element in a rational program of
surface mining regulation. While performance standards should
be cast in terms of general applicability, the Committee recognizes that land use considerations may justify a variance from
the general standard or that a variable standard should be implemented in recognition of the distinctions in climate, terrain,
and other physical features.1

A distinction was drawn between reclamation goals and the methods of achieving those goals-leaving the latter to the operator in
accordance with the peculiarities of his particular mine site.
The emphasis on return to the approximate original contour
should not obscure the fact that the appropriate methodology
will vary from site to site. Responsibility for devising methods
for reaching any necessary reclamation goals should be left up
to the operator. Within the limits of economic constraints, the
available equipment and his own ingenuity, the surface mining
operator will develop whatever approach
best suits his needs
32
and the peculiarities of his mining site.
Congress assumed that variances to the regulations would be
granted by OSM. In addressing the problems operators would en11H.R. REP. No. 1072, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1974).
2 Id. at 65. When the statutory provision requiring operators to return mined
land to its approximate original contour, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(d)(2) (West Supp.
1978), was discussed by the Senate Committee, it had been erroneously suggested
that the Committee preferred a specific reclamation practice used in Pennsylvania.
The Committee responded that "this is not the case. The Committee is prescribing
performance standards to achieve a certain degree of reclamation-the Committee
has no intention of dictating how those standards are achieved." See S. REP. No.
402, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1973).
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counter in attaining compliance with OSM's regulations, the
House Committee stated:
[Ain operator may have to accomplish significant adjustments
in his operations to achieve initial compliance . . . . [Wihere
an operator is attempting to obtain a variance under the Act to
allow the continuation of a particular operation, it is not the
intention of the Committee that the operation be interrupted if
action on the variance application is not taken prior to the
implementation of the interim standards . . . [Tihe operator
acting in good faith should not be unfairly penalized.?
It was most important to the Congress that an operator's compliance with the statutory requirements be meaningful, that any
given requirement not become a matter of mere ritual. "[Ilf the
mine design objectives include the environmental performance
standards as elements to be thoroughly integrated in the overall
mining process instead of treated as separate rituals to be performed merely because they are required, then it is quite probable
that accomplishment of environmental practices will become cost13
effective." '
The requirements were to be general in order to achieve an
"element of flexibility" and not preclude beneficial practices. The
House Committee emphasized that "[workable Federal requirements must be appropriate to the mining setting and such standards should not preclude practices which are beneficial from a
planning viewpoint. ' ''3' Thus, in reviewing the history of prior legislative surface mining proposals, it appears that Congress did not
intend to establish nationwide design criteria nor did it intend to
have performance standards which could not accommodate local
characteristics, problems or practices.
IV.

PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS SHOULD
ENSURE OPERATOR FLEXIBILITY.

Not only are OSM's requirements that operators design, construct or operate in accordance with specific criteria or methodology an apparent violation of its enabling legislation, but they also
raise questions of due process of law. These problems are most
pronounced in situations where OSM requirements make it financially impracticable to mine certain reserves or make it impossible

3

H.R. REP. No. 45, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 86 (1975).
Id. at 92.
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 85 (1975).
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for an operator to continue an ongoing operation. But even short
of closure of all or parts of an operation, the unreasonability of the

regulations must be questioned. 6
It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that persons should be able to obtain timely and effective relief from gen-

eral regulations where application of such regulations will cause
hardship and where the goals of the underlying statute can be
obtained reasonably by imposing lesser burdens on the regulated
party. As stated in the decision of WAIT Radio v. FCC, an
"agency's discretion to .proceed in difficult areas through general
rules is intimately linked to the existence of a safety valve procedure for consideration of an application for exemption based on
special circumstances . . . . [A] system where regulations are

maintained inflexibly without any procedure for waiver poses legal
difficulties."

-7

More specifically, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that:
[A] rule is more likely to be undercut if it does not in some way
take into account considerations of hardship, equity or more
effective implementation of overall policy, considerations that
3,"The modem, prevailing view is that any substantial interference with private property which destroys or lessens its valde (or by which the owner's right to
its use or enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed) is, in fact
and in law, a 'taking' in the constitutional sense. .

." 2 J. SAcKMAN, NiCHOLs' THE

LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (3rd ed. 1976) (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963) and Todd v. United States, 292 F.2d 841 (Ct. Cl. 1961)). The taking need
not be either a physical appropriation, United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 26162 (1946), or permanent in nature. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S.
1 (1949).
418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). See
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S.
33, 39-42 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 204.05
(1956); Pikes Peak Broadcasting v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 979 (1969); WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); Am. Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). The power of an agency to
promulgate general regulations in the public interest "does not relieve it of an
obligation to seek out the 'public interest' in particular, individualized cases."
WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1027 (1972). Variance provisions from EPA effluent limitations are required under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to accommodate variations in individual
plants. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977); see
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, No. 76-1674 (D.C. Cir. 1978); U.S. Steel v. Train, 556
F.2d 822, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1977).
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an agency cannot realistically ignore, at least on a continuing
basis. The limited safety valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective regulation.
Thus, procedures to treat hardship situations are central to the
integrity of the administrative process. 9 A regulation standing
alone with no provision for relief from rather drastic commands,
may pose constitutional problems under the fifth amendment. 0
And quite significantly, if a mechanism for granting such relief is
afforded, it must be effective. 1
Variances are, in fact, most important in situations such as
this where it is unlikely that the hasty imposition of such a highly
technical nationwide regulatory scheme on an entire industry will
afford the operators and OSM a sufficient opportunity to consider
the full range of impacts the regulations are likely to have. It is
inevitable that problems will arise that could not have been foreseen when the regulations were under consideration. It is these
problems that variance procedures are equipped to resolve. An
administrative variance procedure is most capable of ensuring
WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1027 (1972). WAIT Radio had requested that the FCC waive certain broadcast
rules (clear channel rules) and thus enable it to operate for extended hours. The
Federal Communications Commission gave little attention to the application for
waiver, as such a waiver would have gone against the policy underlying the clear
channel rules. Id. at 1157. The court of appeals emphasized the need to allow for
waivers if an agency is to regulate by general rule, and thus remanded to enable
the FCC to consider WAIT's paiticular circumstances. Id. at 1160. Similarly, the
failure to grant a zoning variance upon presentation of evidence of social and
economic hardship has also been held to be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of
discretion. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Hoffman, 43 N.Y.2d 598, 403 N.Y.
Supp. 193 (N.Y. Ct. App., February 14, 1978).
31Such variance procedures "ameliorate the rigors of mechanical application
of the rules in appropriate cases without making the application of the rules unduly
complex for the agency." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hickel, 435 F.2d 440, 447 (D.C. Cir.
1970). They impart a construction of "reasonableness" to the standards as a whole
and create a more flexible system of regulation than can be had by a system devoid
of flexibility. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 399 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); see Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckeshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
,0 Community Service, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 709, 711-12, (6th Cir.
1967).
1' Southwest Pennsylvania Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). Administrators must "give meaningful consideration" to variance requests. WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1027 (1972).
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prompt, efficient resolution of technical issues as they arise.2 It
would thus instill a sens6 of "fairplay" into the regulatory process.
Furthermore, OSM's approach raises what may be considered
an irrebuttable presumption. The Surface Mining Act establishes
environmental protection as a primary objective. 3 The regulations
provide that in certain instances the only way in which the statutory obectives may be met is to follow the Secretary's design criteria. If not followed, there is no opportunity to show that one can
otherwise meet these objectives. Hence, an irrebuttable presumption is established, i.e. a failure to meet the design criteria automatically amounts to a failure to meet the performance objectives
of the Act. Such a presumption may in itself amount to a violation
of due process of .law."
11There can be no doubt of OSM's authority to promulgate exemption procedures. "It is well established that an agency's authority to proceed in a complex
area . . . by means of rules of general application entails a concomitant authority
to provide exemption procedures in order to allow for special circumstances."
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 755 (1972). See also
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784-86 (1968). Indeed, OSM acknowledged, while promulgating its regulations, that "the Secretary has the duty,
within the constraints of the'Act, to resolve practical problems on a case-by-case
basis." 42 Fed. Reg, 62,641 (1977). Provisions for variances, modifications, and
exceptions are appropriate to the regulatory process. NRDC v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642,
646 (2d Cir. 1976); Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 399 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U:S. 921 (1974). Addressing itself to the analogous EPA
water pollution control program, the court in NRDC explained:
In the context of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments the variance provision is peculiarly appropriate. The sheer number
of point sources potentially subject to regulation and the rapidly approaching statutory deadlines required the EPA to restrict itself in the
regulation promulgation process to a representative sampling of plants.
It is entirely possible that the resulting regulations will prove ill-suited
to some of the unsampled individual plants to which they will be applied
in the permit process. Unless the variance clause is established, there is
no guarantee that such a defect could be effectively remedied if it occurred ....
537 F.2d at 647. Moreover, Section 201(c)(2) of the SMCRA authorizes the Secretary to "publish and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1211(c)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
See also Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976).
13See U.S.C.A. § 1202 (West Supp. 1978).
44See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 633, 643-50 (1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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V.

THE OSM "COOKBOOK" APPROACH, COMPOUNDED
By INADEQUATE VARIANCE PROVISIONS,

AMOUNTS To GOVERNMENTAL INSENSITviTY
To THE PRACTICALITIES OF MINING OPERATIONS.

The interim regulatory program, in place and likely to be
effective for over two years, brings potential difficulty to surface
and underground operators. Notwithstanding the tremendous diversity of operations noted above, OSM's basic regulatory scheme
is, with relatively few exceptions, applicable to the industry acrossthe-board. Although differences in size and geography are alluded
to in a few places, they are for the most part disregarded on the
ground that "uniform standards ensure consistent enforcement
and avoid conflicting interpretations of the regulations in different
regions."' 5 Rather, OSM has proceeded with specific design criteria for construction and land reclamation, with mandatory limitations, and with strict prohibitions. To make the situation even
worse for operators, OSM also rejected variance mechanisms
which would take into account, and provide relief for, specific circumstances in which the broad regulations are particularly inappropriate. Thus, as will be illustrated herein, the combination of
such "cookbook" requirements and inadequate procedures for obtaining variances therefrom, will inevitably lead to situations
where the cost and production of coal are needlessly subordinated
to apparent environmental protection. The costs to the industry,
and ultimately to the energy consumer, are often likely to outweigh
any prospective environmental benefits. 6 Although it is almost
universally agreed that control over surface mining and reclamation efforts is beneficial to the public and worthy of some costs of
production, such costs must be reasonable. They must yield an
appreciable benefit in return for any given expense. Examples
42 Fed. Reg. 62,640 (1970).
The Department of Energy criticized OSM's use of "design-specific standards" generally.
[I]n a number of instances, the regulations specify design-specific
standards either in addition to or in lieu of performance standards. While
we are aware of the argument that design-specific standards simplify
enforcement of the regulations, we feel that such an approach limits the
ability of the States and OSM Regional Directors to take into account
regional diversity in terrain, climate and other physical conditions. Fur-

thermore, mining operations may be prohibited in instances where surface mining is technically, economically and environmentally feasible.

Dep't of Energy, Comments on Draft Permanent Regulations 2-3 (Aug. 18, 1978).
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where OSM has failed to demonstrate sufficient sensitivity to the
practicalities of mining operations and to operators' particular circumstances follow.
A.

Underdrainsfor Head-of-Hollow
Or Valley Fills.

A substantial amount of the overburden which is removed to
uncover a coal seam in surface mining and the spoil from tunneling
in underground mines is disposed of by construction of "fills" elsewhere in the permit area. The regulations recognize two classes of
fills; those constructed in valleys or heads-of-hollows and those
constructed elsewhere. OSM's regulations broadly define a "valley
fill and head-of-hollow fill" as any fill placed so as to encroach
upon or obstruct to any degree any natural drainage channel." The
regulations further state that "[if any portion of the fill interrupts, obstructs, or encroaches upon any natural drainage channel
then the entire fill is to be classified as a valley or head-of-hollow
fill."4" Such fills must be constructed in accordance with rigorous
design standards set forth in section 715.15(b) of the regulations."
These standards include specific means to attempt to obtain proper drainage and maintain fill stability.
OSM's goal of achieving fill stability and drainage is certainly
appropriate and adequately authorized by section 515(b)(22) of the
Surface Mining Act. 0 Its employment, however, of a single inflexible set of design criteria was unjustified. The regulations require
that all surface drainage from the surface area of the fill itself and
from other surface areas above the fill be diverted away from the
fill to prevent saturation of the fill and to curtail soil erosion on
the fill's surface. Moreover, the regulations require the installation
of a system of underdrains in every fill. They must be constructed
42 Fed. Reg. 62,679 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 710.5).
42 Fed. Reg. 62,683 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.15(a)(8)).
" 42 Fed. Reg. 62,683 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.15(b)),
30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(22) (West Supp. 1978). The Secretary is directed to
develop performance standards requiring the mine operation to
place all excess spoil material resulting from coal surface mining and
reclamation activities in such a manner that-(A) spoil is transported
and placed in a controlled manner in position for concurrent compaction
and in such a way to assure mass stability and to prevent mass movement; [and] (C) appropriate surface and internal drainage systems and
diversion ditches are used so as to prevent spoil erosion and movement
.... Id.
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in accordance with particular specifications, including minimum
dimensions, and minimum and maximum durable rock size out of
which the drain is to be constructed.
Substantial documentation was received by the agency during
the notice and comment period that there were generally accepted
alternative means of achieving these results." The Bureau of
Mines criticized that "unreasoned adherence to [underdrainj
dimensions may result in considerable unnecessary cost for some
fill construction.""2 The Administrator of MESA commented that
underdrains should be designed using criteria dictated by the particular site. 3 The Department of Agriculture stated that experience has proved that valley fill stability and hydrological system
protection can be achieved with site-specific criteria for underdrains. 4 In general, it should have been clear to the agency that
site-specific construction was most appropriate-taking into account the fill's location in relation to the drainage channel in question, the amount of drainage, site topography, available material,
intended land use and the revegetation and construction techniques of the particular fill.
This problem is most acute in West Virginia, where accepted
engineering practices included a rock core drainage system which
channeled surface water to and through the rock core rather than
55The rock core system maintains the
diverting the water around it.
" The underdrain requirements in interim regulation § 715.15(b)(6) drew almost universal criticism for their lack of flexibility. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,683 (1977) (to
be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.15(b)(6)). Nearly every critical comment urged the
adoption of either site-specific underdrain requirements or provisions for variances
upon approval of a certified engineer. Criticism came not only from industry (Allied
Chemical Corp., Consolidation Coal Co., Island Creek Coal Co., Mapco Coals,
Monterrey Coal Co., National Mines Corp., North American Coal Corp., Peabody
Coal Co., R & F Coal Co., United States Steel Corp., and West Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n) but also from a number of private consulting engineering and surveying firms (Bowser-Momer Testing Lab., Inc.; D'Appalonia Consulting Engineers; Dunlop Surveying, Inc.; and Skelly & Loy) and several agencies
of the Federal Government (Bureau of Mines, the Department of Agriculture, and

MESA).
51Bureau of Mines, Comments Submitted in Response to OSM's Proposed
Interim Regulations (1977).
MESA, Comments Submitted in Response to OSM's Proposed Interim Regulations (1977).
11Dep't of Agriculture, Comments Submitted in Response to OSM's Proposed
Interim Regulations (1977).
" W.VA. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DRAINAGE HANDBOOK FOR SURFACE

MINING 55-57 (1975).
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natural course of the stream flow and also reduces the amount of
sedimentation in the runoff, functioning as a filter." Needless to
say, reconstruction of existing fill underdrains would be extraordinarily expensive if not physically impossible due to the nature of
the problem. Moreover, substantial expert opinion has questioned
the propriety of OSM's design standards in West Virginia's steep
slope terrain. Nearly all excess spoil fills constructed in such
mountainous terrain will be classified as head-of-hollow or valley
fills, thus the regulation has far-reaching effects." Secondly,
OSM's design standards may themselves be environmentally unsound and possibly hazardous." The fact that conformance with
these standards will end the shift towards rock core underdrains
in steep-slope mining areas is a perfect example of the regulations'
tendency to discourage what many consider to be technological
advances.". 1
B.

Compaction of Spoil in Head-of-Hollow
or Valley Fills.

A second costly problem with OSM's spoil disposal regulations pertains to the requirements for compaction when spoil is
The fact that OSM's design standards channel drainage around the valley
of head-of-hollow fill raises the question of whether such standards are consistent
with Congress' intent. Section 515(b)(22)(G) of the SMCRA requires that excess
spoil material must be placed in such a manner that "the final configuration is
compatible with the natural drainage pattern." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(22)(G) (West
Supp. 1978). The regulation, however, alters the flow of drainage water from the
center to the sides of the valley in which the fill is located.
Furthermore, the same stringent design criteria intended to ensure fill stability will be applicable, where fills are placed in drainage ways, to such areas as the
flat or gently sloping terrain of the midwest. See 42 Fed. Reg. 62,679 (1977) (to be
codified in 30 C.F.R. § 710.5).
m It is claimed that locating drainage ditches pursuant to OSM's design criteria has resulted in spoil erosion in West Virginia. Affidavit of William S. Ritchie,
President, Hobet Mining and Construction Company, Inc., In Re Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 782190, 78-2191, 78-2192 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 1978). Section 515(b) (22) (C) of the Act,
however, requires "appropriate surface and internal drainage systems and diversion
ditches [to be] used so as to prevent spoil erosion and movement." Thus, the
propriety of this regulation is further called into question. 30 U.S.C.A. §
1265(b)(22)(C) (West Supp. 1978).
u-1 It should be noted that the Secretary of the Department of the Interior was
directed to reconsider § 715.15(b) of the interim regulations in light of allegations
in Surface Mining Litigation that an update of the Skelly & Loy Interm Report,
supranote 10, undermined these design criteria. See SKELLY & Loy, ENVIRONMENTAL
AssESSMENT OF SURFACE MINING METHODS, HEAD-oF-HoLLow FILL AND MOUNTAINTOP
REMOVAL (Interim Report, 1978).
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placed in head-of-hollow or valley fills. Section 715.15(b) (7) of the
regulations requires that spoil be compacted "in lifts that are less
than 4 feet thick in order to achieve the densities designed to
ensure mass stability, to prevent mass movement, to avoid contamination of the rock underdrain and to prevent formation of
voids." 9 Here again, OSM's adoption of detailed design criteria is
not an appropriate means of regulation. The need for flexibility of
design was almost the universal criticism of commentators on this
regulation during the public comment period. 0 In fact, one noted
engineering firm, the D'Appalonia Consulting Engineers,"' stated
that of all of the regulations, the four foot lift requirement was the
one to which they had the strongest objection.2
5'42 Fed. Reg. 62,684 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.15(b)(7)).
60 This criticism was posited in comments submitted by industry, including
Carter Oil Company, Consolidation Coal Company, Mapco Coals, National Mines
Corp., NCA/AMC Joint Committee On Surface Mining Regulations, North American Coal Corp., Peabody Coal Company, Chaco Energy Company, Tesoro Coal
Company, Island Creek Coal Company, R&F Coal Company, Kentucky Coal Association. It was also criticized in comments submitted by independent consulting
engineers, including D'Appalonia Consulting Engineers and Bowser-Morner Testing Lab, Inc. Among those suggesting that the four-foot lift requirement be deleted
in favor of a site-specific approach was the Administrator of MESA. MESA's expertise was specifically recognized by Congress in its requirement that the written
concurrence of the head of the department administering the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act be obtained prior to promulgation of underground mining regulations.
30 U.S.C.A., § 1266(b) (West Supp. 1978). See H.R. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 109 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 728, 740, and
S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1977). The fact that the Administrator
failed to concur with this regulation was sidestepped by the court in the Surface
Mining Litigation upon the finding that obtaining the concurrence of the Administrator of MESA, because he was "a subordinate of the Secretary," would have been
only a formality. In Re Surface Mining Litigation 452 F. Supp. 327, 336 (D.D.C.
1978).
11The D'Appalonia Engineers were retained by OSM to perform most of the
government's economic analysis of the permanent regulatory program.
62 As a broadly accepted alternative design method, D'Appalonia referred the
Secretary to Chapters 5 and 8 of MESA's Engineering and Design Manual for Coal
Refuse Disposal Facilities. Another prominent engineer, John Robins, stated in
public rulemaking hearings in Charleston, West Virignia, that design flexibility was
necessary because "spoil composition and physical properties are extremely sitespecific factors," and that "some spoils require restrictive lifts to achieve stability
while others are inherently stable in much larger lifts." J. Robins, Skelly & Loy
(consulting engineers), Transcriptof PublicHearings on ProposedInterim Regulations at Charleston, West Virginia, 376 (Sept. 21, 1977) (Mr. Robins was one of the
authors of the Skelly & Loy report which OSM attempted to rely upon as the basis
for its inflexible four-foot lift requirement during litigation).
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As indicated in the language of the regulation itself, the essential purpose of the requirement is purported to be to ensure mass
stability of the fill. However, mass stability is a function of a series
of variables, only one of which includes compaction. The relevant
variables are foundation strength, water infiltration, fill material
strength and embankment geometry. Each variable can be adjusted by varying an element of the design or a technique of construction." An accepted means of ensuring stability is to adjust
each of the variables for a particular site until an aggregate "safety
factor," or strength is achieved. Many different combinations can
be effective in achieving this mass stability. By mandating that
operators compact spoil in four foot lifts, the regulations severely
limit an engineer's ability to achieve the necessary "safety factor.""4 It forecloses the possibility of using their construction techniques or a range of lift heights to achieve the appropriate spoil
density, or to vary spoil density with other stability variables.
Moreover, it ignores the size of the fill and the degree to which it
actually encroaches upon a watercourse. 5 Most significantly, it
ignores the almost universal warnings of the importance in the
differences between fill sites, fill materials, and the effect which fill
materials have on spoil stability.
C. Hydrology: Suspended Solids
in Discharge Water.
OSM has also been too inflexible in regulating the suspended
solids contained in waters flowing through or from a mining operaFoundation strength can be increased by providing keyway cuts or rock
buttresses. Water infiltration will vary depending upon the size of underdrains, the
degree to which surface drainage is not successfully directed away from the fill,
and the permeability of the material in the fill. Fill material strength can be varied
by compaction and other construction techniques. Embankment geometry can
vary considerably, too.
" Compaction, or compaction in lifts of a maximum thickness, may or may
not be a satisfactory method of establishing the appropriate spoil density to insure
mass stability. The minimum spoil density is itself a site-specific variable that will
be determined by engineers in the course of stability analysis. Upon such determination, engineers can then establish the degree of compaction and technique of
compaction needed to achieve that density. That determination can vary in relation
to the other variables, all of which will vary depending on site and fill material.
11The unreasonableness of the four-foot life compaction requirement becomes
even more apparent when given a concrete application. If a fill were thousands of
feet wide and hundreds of feet thick, the fact that tiny intermittent streams flowing
only for a few months in a year intercepted a corner of it should not provide a basis

for such compaction.
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tion.6 In order to reduce the amount of solids, the agency requires
that operators pass all drainage from "disturbed areas" through
sedimentation, or settling, ponds where suspended matter is intended to "settle out" of the water before the water passes out of
the mining area. In addition, the agency requires that all such
water meet specified numerical effluent limitations.17 OSM has
promulgated this requirement notwithstanding EPA's comprehensive regulation of the same subject in a similar manner.18 Thus, the
very fact that OSM has established such a comprehensive regulatory scheme duplicative in purpose to EPA's program must be
questioned.69 Not only has it taken costly bureaucratic work to
establish, administer and enforce the extra scheme, but operators
are now forced to comply with and respond to a second set of
regulations and participate in a second set of reporting requirements on an ongoing basis. If OSM believed EPA's work to be
inadequate, then it would seem that the appropriate solution
should have been to work through administrative channels for
improvement.
1. Sedimentation Ponds.
Putting aside the costly problems due to duplication of federal
efforts, OSM's regulatory scheme, as originally promulgated, was
inflexible in its requirement that sedimentation ponds be constructed pursuant to specific design criteria.7 After substantial
industry criticism, OSM amended its original regulations but continued to take an approach requiring the construction of ponds
7
pursuant to fixed design criteria. '

'5 OSM's technical definition of "suspended solids" is "organic or inorganic
materials carried or held in suspension in water that will remain on a 0.45 micronfilter." 42 Fed. Reg. 62,679 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 710.5).
1142 Fed. Reg. 62,685 and 62,696 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§
715.17(a) and 717.17(a)).
0 EPA Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Coal Mining Point Source Category, 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.10 to 434.42 (1976).
69 OSM's authority for promulgating these particular regulations has undergone challenge by industry in the Surface Mining Litigation.See supranote 7. The
substance of that challenge is, for the most part, beyond the scope of this article.
1042 Fed. Reg. 62,686 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(e)).
"1 43 Fed. Reg. 8090 to 8093 (1978) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 710.11,
715.17, 717.17). The House Committee specifically acknowledged that this approach was inappropriate for sedimentation control:
Similarly, technology exists to prevent increased sediment loads resulting from mining from reaching streams outside the permit area. Sedi-
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The first problem with these regulations was that they failed
to consider the variations in terrain where the ponds were to be
built. In consideration of the steep-slope mountainous areas, alternatives for sedimentation control should have been permitted. In
steep-slope areas, there may be insufficient land available for the
appropriately sized ponds and, in some instances, excessively high
dams might have to be constructed to meet the design requirements.7 2 Thus, the use of ponds as primary sediment control structures may prove to be unsafe, technically difficult and, consequently, quite costly. 3 Either the use of site-specific designs or the
ment or siltation control systems are generally designed on a mine-bymine basis which could involve several drainage areas or on a smalldrainage-area basis which may serve severl [sic.] mines. There are a
number of different measures that when applied singly or in combination
can remove virtually all sediment or silt resulting from the mining operation. A range of individual siltation control measures includes: erosion
and sediment control structures, chemical soil stabilizers, mulches,
mulch blankets, and special control practices such as adjusting the timing and sequencing of earth movement, pumping drainage, and establishing vegetative filter strips.
• . . With this approach, the committee believes that operators will find
the right combination of techniques to meet the siltation standard on the
most cost-effective basis.
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 114, 115, reprinted in [19771 U.S. COnE
CONG. & AD. NEws 647-648. The Department of Energy criticized OSM's proposed
interim regulations on this basis also: "The design criteria are too specific and could
result in the construction of ponds too large or too small depending on local sediment loads and microclimatic variability. Overly designed structures could conceivably disturb more land than necessary and more reliance should be given to
local engineering practices and policies." Dep't of Energy, Comments Submitted
to OSM's Proposed Interim Regulations (Oct. 7,1977). The Bowser-Morner Testing
Lab, Inc. gave OSM some sense of the magnitude of the problem caused by the
pond design criteria as originally proposed: "This regulation will require the complete reconstruction of practically every sedimentation pond in the United States.
No state currently has regulations as stringent as those imposed by this particular
section." D. Cowherd, Bowser-Morner Testing Lab, Inc., Comments Submitted in
Response to OSM's Proposed Interim Regulations (Oct. 1977).
7 "In areas of Appalachia where space is limited, the use of ponds as the sole
or primary control structure is often technically difficult and therefore costly."
Dep't of Energy, Comments on Draft Permanent Regulations § 1.C.1 (Aug. 18,
1978).
" OSM received commentary that construction of ponds in West Virginia pursuant to OSM design could result in ponds wider than the valleys in which they
were to be constructed and the disturbance of more land than the entire mining
operation would disturb. Building such large ponds on steep slopes was said to
create potentially hazardous conditions. See V. Green, Eagle Coal & Rock Co.,
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use of means other than settling ponds could have avoided these
problems. In addition, the use of specific design criteria largely
ignores differences in climate, soil composition and size of the
relevant disturbed area. All of these factors affect the degree of
sedimentation and thus the propriety of particular pond designs.
Each could be addressed by on-site engineering analysis."
Regardless of the effectiveness of these specific design criteria,
it was inappropriate to require operators to undertake a costly
reconstruction of all their existing ponds to comply with these
standards without a showing that their present ponds are inadequate." Moreover, requiring reconstruction in such a short time
frame caused costs to be exacerbated and may have created greater
environmental problems than those the regulations were designed
to alleviate. 6
2. Numerical Effluent Limitations.
Notwithstanding that OSM required operators to construct
Comments Submitted in Response to OSM's Proposed Interim Regulations (Oct.
3, 1977).
11Requiring that settling ponds be used and that they be constructed to particular specifications is an exemplification of the regulations' propensity to deter
technological advance. According to comments submitted to OSM, a current experimental project being conducted by West Coal Company near Huntsville, Tennessee has demonstrated that fabric silt fences and fabric silt basins are very effective
in sedimentation control and may be used in lieu of settling ponds in many locations. See Univ. of Tenn., Comments Submitted in Response to OSM's Proposed
Interim Regulations (Oct. 7, 1977).
11The Interim Regulations require that all operations be in compliance with
the initial regulatory program by May 3, 1978. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,679 (1977) (to be
codified in 30 C.F.R. § 710.11(a)(3)(ii)). Operators were granted a limited extension
of time, to November 4, 1978, to bring into compliance "[alny pre-existing, nonconforming structure or facility ... used in connection with or to facilitate mining
after the effective date of [the] regulations." 42 Fed. Reg. 62,679 (1977) (to be
codified in 30 C.F.R. § 710.11(d)(2)).
'1 Note that the short period for bringing facilities into compliance meant that
many operators were forced to either work in winter (to the extent possible in areas
not covered by ice and snow) or under spring melting conditions. However, after
ice and snow melts the underlying soil would be saturated with moisture and thus
compaction characteristics of the earth which would be needed to construct sedimentation ponds would be very erratic and poor. If the heavy machinery necessary
to construct ponds was taken into the mountainous areas while the soil was saturated with moisture it would result in both extremely difficult working conditions
and substantial environmental damage. Moreover, during the substantial period of
reconstruction, it is likely that the water quality standards presently maintained
would not be met.
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sedimentation ponds according to its own particular design criteria
to reduce suspended solids in discharge water, it also required
operators to meet specified numerical effluent standards which
included a limitation for "total suspended solids."" Thus, even if
operators construct or reconstruct ponds as required, there is no

guarantee that these operations will be in compliance with federal
sedimentation requirements. In fact, a common criticism from the
industry was that the designated pond design standards had never
been shown by even a single test pond to be capable of achieving
the numerical effluent limitations. Moreover, the limitations in
question were, with three critical omissions, duplicative of EPA
effluent limitations. 8 These three omissions, however, represent a

substantial failure on the part of OSM to attend to the problems
and circumstances of individual operators.
OSM omitted EPA's variance mechanism under which effluent limits could be modified for particular mining operations
upon a showing of good cause. Under EPA guidelines, the operator
is entitled to request a variance from the limitations by presenting
relevant data to the agency. 9 This regulatory variance procedure
7

42 Fed. Reg. 62,685 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(a)).

78See 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.22, 434.32, 434.42 (1977). Congress had intended that

OSM's regulations not conflict with those of EPA.
The EPA has been directed by the Congress to insure the environmental
well-being of the country. EPA has established water quality standards,
air quality standards, and implementation and compliance requirements
for the coal mining and processing industry, and issues permits to the
industry to insure appropriate pollution abatement and environmental
protection. The committee concluded that because of the likeness of
EPA's abatement programs and the procedures, standards, and other
requirements of this bill, it is imperative that maximum coordination be
required and that any risk of duplication or conflict be minimized.
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142, reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 674.
71 EPA was particularly concerned that conformance with its strict standards
may require the use of unsafe construction techniques under certain circumstances.
Where safety considerations conflict with the effluent limits, for example, EPA
made it clear that the numerical effluent standards would give way:
Should any evidence be submitted to the Agency to indicate that the
impoundment facilities needed to meet these regulations would necessitate construction of a structure which would violate safety standards set
out by a State or Federal Agency, EPA will consider the granting of a
variance on an expedited basis. Under no circumstances will an owner or
operator be required to violate applicable safety standards in order to
meet these regulations.
EPA Summary of Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Coal Mining Point Source
Category. 42 Fed. Reg. 21,381 (1977) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. Part 434).
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was designed as a pressure valve to dissipate unfair or impractical
applications of standards in particular instances of demonstrable
harm. As such, it is an integral element of EPA's regulatory
scheme. OSM, however, made the same effluent limitations invariable.
OSM next omitted EPA's provision" for exempting from the
limitations overflows from effluent control facilities constructed in
conformity with EPA regulations. Thus, the fact that an operator
constructs his ponds pursuant to the regulatory authority's standards was deemed to be insufficient compliance to OSM, though
satisfactory to EPA. The omission of EPA's exemption provision
means that an operator will have to make more substantial and
apparently less cost-effective efforts to ensure conformance with
the numerical limits."'
OSM's third omission was a procedure whereby the operator
was "credited" for the suspended solids in its water prior to flowing
through the disturbed area. 2 In other words, OSM is holding the
operator responsible for the total suspended solids discharged from
mining areas rather than the increment added to the water by the
coal mining operation. It would appear to be unreasonable to require one operator to assume, as part of its cost of coal production,
the responsibility of attending to the pollutants caused by other
40 C.F.R. § 434.32 (1977).
Under EPA regulations, a mine operator who constructs a facility or pond
which can contain waters from a design precipitation event (this is the maximum
rainfall that statistically can be expected during any 24 hour period over the course
of a ten year measuring period) is entitled to an absolute exemption for all effluents
from the pond:
This does not mean that only after a rainfall equalling or exceeding
the 10-year, 24-hour precipitation event may untreated effluent be discharged. It means that after a precipitation event or other cause (snowmelt, for example) which forces an overflow, by-pass, or increase in the
volume of point source discharge from a facility designed, constructed
and maintained to contain or treat the amount of water which will result
from the 10-year, 24-hour, precipitation event, the overflow, by-pass or
increase in volume of the point source discharge shall be permitted.
42 Fed. Reg. 21,381 (1977). Whereas EPA exempts all overflows from a design
facility, OSM exempts only those overflows which the operator can prove actually
result from a 10-year, 24-hour precipitation event. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,685 (1977) (to
be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(a)(1)). Not only does OSM unreasonably require
compliance with effluent limitations under circumstances exempted by EPA, but
in those instances where an exemption is available it has imposed on operators a
heavy burden of proof not present under the EPA program.
.2 40 C.F.R. § 434.42 (1977).
"
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operators or by natural means. EPA, under principles which appear to be applicable to OSM, regulates only those pollutants
added to.the water by a given party." Requiring such a strict level
of pollution control imposes a costly burden on mine operators.
D.

Waste Dam Construction.

The construction of dams made of waste was another subject
which OSM regulated by design criteria which does not permit
operators sufficient flexibility. Two provisions cause particular
concern: the minimum drawdown criteria and the required freeboard height. 4
9340 C.F.R. §§ 125.24(c), 125.28 (1977). See, e.g., American Iron and Steel Inst.
v. EPA, 543 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1976); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d
1023, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); American Iron and
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1056 (3d Cir. 1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978). EPA's net-gross regulations are an
integral part of its regulatory scheme. Provision for them is required by law. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1377-78 (4th Cir. 1976); American Iron
and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 543 F.2d at 524, n.6; American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540
F.2d at 1034-35; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 637 (2d
Cir. 1976); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1056. OSM would
appear to be subject'to a similar requirement. Although a discussion of this is
beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that requiring operators to be
responsible for sediment already in the water before it reaches the operation likely
violates two separate sections of the SMCRA as well as principles of due process.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(10)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1978) requires operators "to prevent,
to the extent possible using the best technology currently available, additional
contributions of suspended solids to streamflow, or runoff outside the permit
area. . . ." (Emphasis added). The legislative history of Section 515(b)(10) indicates that Congress intended to regulate only additions to suspended solids contributed by mining, as opposed to background suspended solids from other sources.
See S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977). Moreover, the courts of
appeals' analysis and due process concerns set forth in the EPA cases cited in this
note should be applicable here. In addition, Section 702(a)(3) of the Surface Mining
Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(3) (West Supp. 1978) appears to prohibit the inevitable
conflict in effluent regulation which would result if OSM is not constrained to
regulating only the incremental increase in suspended solids. Section 702(a) states
that:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as superseding, amending, modifying or repealing. . . any of the following Acts or with any rule
or regulation promulgated thereunder, including, but not limited to(3) The Federal Water Pollution Control Act. . ., the State laws
enacted pursuant thereto, or other federal laws relating to preservation of water quality.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a) (West Supp. 1978).
" Both of these provisions, §§ 715.18(b)(ii) and (vii), were enjoined by the
court in In Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation to permit the Secretary to
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1. Minimum Drawdown.
Section 715.18(b)(vii) of the regulations requires that dams
impounding water must be constructed in such a manner that the
facility can be evacuated by spillways or decants (channels or
pours) of ninety percent "of the volume of water stored during the
design precipitation event within 10 days." ' This requirement
applies across the board, regardless of either the dam's location or
its size. There is no provision for an administrative variance.
In promulgating the regulation, OSM's Statement of Basis
and Purpose set forth no rationale for its inflexibility. Other than
a general allusion to safety requirements, no specific purpose was
cited. The agency merely stated, in rebuttal to public comment,
that "[t]hese criteria have been retained for compliance with
Corps of Engineers safety criteria for similar structures."86 The
Corps of Engineers, however, requires a seventy-five percent evacuation, not a ninety percent evacuation. Moreover, the Corps of
Engineers permits exceptions to its requirements on a cite specific
basis.Y Thus, the Statement of Basis and Purpose was inaccurate
and indicates that the requirements really had no support. It is
important to note that MESA also has a more limited safety
standard; i.e. the approval of the construction of large dams when
it is shown that they can sufficiently contain storm waters as an
alternative to a ninety percent drawdown design criteria. 8
accept additional comments and reconsider them. 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1326 (D.D.C.
1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-2190, 78-2191, 78-2192 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 1978).

See supra note 69 (definition of "design precipitation event").
"

42 Fed. Reg. 62,658 (1977).
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ENGINEERING MANUAL

No. 1110-2-1101 at 6 (Office of the

Chief of Engineers 1968).

Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 220.1 (1978).
"1By constructing embankments which can impound a greater amount of

water, operators avoid the potential unsafe condition caused by substantial water
flowing into the impoundment in a short period of time. During the pendency of In

re Surface Mining Resulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal
docketed, nos. 78-2190, 78-2191, 78-2192 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 20, 1978), the Government
attempted to rely on a study by the D'Appalonia Consulting Engineers as the basis
for its requirement. That study, however, falls short of justifying the agency's
invariable requirement. Although generally subscribing to the need for a ninety

percent drawdown capability, it cautioned that dams could be designed larger than
is necessary to impound the waters from one design precipitation event and that
evacuation for such dams should be examined in greater depth-such considerations being beyond the scope of the study. D'APPALONIA CONSULTNG ENGINEERS,
D'APPALONiA ENGINEERING AND DESIGN MANuAL 6.60-61 (1977). Furthermore, the
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What OSM has apparently assumed is that all dams will be
hazardous to life and property, without regard to the terrain or size
of the watershed in which they are situated. But the dangers associated with faulty dams located in deep yalleys in populated areas
simply do not exist in flatter rural and unpopulated areas, particularly in the western states where so much of the country's surface
mining is conducted. The agency's single nationwide rule does not
take account of these differences.
To meet OSM's ninety percent evacuation requirement, operators must construct expensive emergency spillways. The volume
capacity of these spillways depends upon expected runoff during
a design precipitation event. Not only may this type of flood control system be much more costly that necessary, but it may also
prove to be less safe. A rapid drawdown could be a danger in and
of itself. If the drawdown is too rapid, it can result in
"embankment slumps" and ultimate dam failure. The use of storage facilities as a flood control system, as suggested here, could
therefore add an extra safety factor by eliminating the need for
rapidly passing flood waters from the impoundment area.
2.

Dam Freeboard.

Section 715.18(b)(3)(ii) of the interim program requires that
a minimum three foot freeboard (the section of the dam wall above
the water surface) be maintained with respect to all dams." OSM
again stated that this standard came from Corps of Engineers
safety criteria." The Corps, however, has no such rigid requirement here either.2 In fact, the agency has essentially adopted
MESA regulations for freeboard height but omitted MESA's provisions for flexibility. MESA's requirements only apply to large
ponds having a dam five feet high with twenty acre feet of volume
or dams twenty feet high." To require a three foot freeboard on
every small dam seems anamolous. Such a freeboard adds significantly to the cost of the structure without any public benefit . 1
study concluded that dam design criteria should be flexible if the dam was to
contain water from a relatively small watershed.
" 42 Fed. Reg. 62,688 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.18(b)(3)(ii)).
" 42 Fed. Reg. 62,658 (1977).
'z Id. n. 4 (citing Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Design Stability of Earth
and Rock-Fill Dams (EM 1110-2-1902) (1970).
'1

30 C.F.R. § 77.216(a)(1) (1977).

The ninety percent drawdown and three foot freeboard requirements were
enjoined in In re Surface Mining RegulationLitigation and remanded to the Secre'-1
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VI.

CONCLUSION.

These are but a few examples of needlessly inflexible provisions. The interim regulations also set forth specific criteria for,
inter alia, filter strips (buffer zones) alongside streams, 4 access
and haul road gradients," blasting distances and velocity and decibel levels," backfilling, grading and terracing, 7 topsoil segregation" and waste cover." In all too many instances, OSM's concern
for protecting the environment has led it to neglect the other important Congressional objectives-enhancing the production and
use of coal and restraining double digit inflation. These too are
important policy concerns and should have been given substantial
attention by a federal agency developing such comprehensive nationwide regulations. While the new legislation was intended to
establish strict controls on surface mining and reclamation and the
surface effects of deep mining, such controls should have been
more carefully imposed to enable each operator to comply with the
Act in the most cost-effective manner. Regulation must be reasonable for our national economy can afford no less.
tary of the Department of the Interior for reconsideratin because both the administrative record and the statement of basis and purpose were inadequate. 456 F.
Supp. at 1316-17. See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1972); National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2nd Cir. 1975); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
42 Fed. Reg. 62,686 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(d)(3)).

'
'5
'

Id. at 62,688 (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(1)).
Id. at 62,690 (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 715.19(e)(1)(vi), (vii), (2)(ii),

(iii)).
7 Id. at 62,681 (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.14).
o' Id. at 62,684 (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.16(a)).
",

Id. at 62,686 (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(g)).
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